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Labor and Employment

by W. Christopher Arbery*
and Valerie N. Njiiri*
The Eleventh Circuit's trial and appellate courts handed down several
significant opinions affecting labor and employment law during this
survey period (January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2006). For example, the
Eleventh Circuit rendered notable decisions involving the Fair Labor2
Standards Act ("FLSA"),' the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"),
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 3 and federal
and state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization ("RICO")
statutes,4 and a district court decided a noteworthy decision under the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
("USERRA"). 5
I.

THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT-COMPENSABLE TIME

In a series of related cases, the Eleventh Circuit and the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida ruled that employees
who begin their workday by picking up an employer vehicle and driving
it to their first job assignment must be compensated for the time driving

* Partner on the Labor and Employment Team in the firm of Hunton & Williams LLP,
Atlanta, Georgia. Harvard University (B.A., cum laude, 1988); University of Georgia
School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1994). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate on the Labor and Employment Team in the firm of Hunton & Williams
LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia (B.S., cum laude, 2001); Mercer University,
Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2005). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-262 (2000).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
4. The pertinent federal RICO statutes are codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1964(c)
(2000). The pertinent state RICO statutes are codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-22(a)(1), 16-144(a)(2003).
5. 38 U.S.C. § 4301 (2000).
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between their employer's parking site and their first assignment under
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). 6
In Burton v. Hillsborough County7 and Silas v. Hillsborough County,'
the plaintiffs, who worked for Hillsborough County's Public Works
Department, filed complaints against Hillsborough County (the
"County") for allegedly failing to compensate them for the time they
spent driving county vehicles from a county parking site to their first
assignment for the day or from their last work-site back to the county
parking site at the end of the day. The County required the plaintiffs
to drive their personal cars to a county parking site where they picked
up county vehicles, which the plaintiffs then drove to a work-site. The
plaintiffs used the county vehicles to travel between work-sites during
the day, and at the end of each day, the plaintiffs returned the vehicles
to the county parking site and retrieved their personal vehicles. The
county vehicles contained tools and equipment that the plaintiffs used
for their jobs and also served as satellite offices from which the plaintiffs
could perform their duties while at a work-site. The County required
the plaintiffs to leave their tools in the county vehicles at the parking
sites at the end of each day. In addition, the County assumed all costs
for vehicle maintenance and fuel. 9
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district
court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment after
concluding that the plaintiffs should be compensated for the travel
time.1° In support of its decision, the district court reasoned that
retrieving and returning the county's vehicles, which contained tools and
equipment necessary for them to perform their jobs, was a principal
activity under the Portal-to-Portal Act.
The district court further
reasoned that the travel time was compensable because it played an
integral part in the plaintiffs' ability to perform their jobs and because
the storage of the vehicles at a county facility primarily benefited the
County. The County appealed this decision. 2

6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-262 (2000); see Burton v. Hillsborough County, 181 F. App'x 829,
838 (11th Cir. 2006); Silas v. Hillsborough County, No. 8:04-CV-1616-T-27TBM, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 79503, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2006).
7. 181 F. App'x 829 (11th Cir. 2006).
8. No. 8:04-CV-1616-T-27TBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79503 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 31,2006).
9. Burton, 181 F. App'x at 831-32; Silas, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79503, at *2-3.
10. Burton, 181 F. App'x at 832; Silas, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79503, at *1.
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (2000); Burton, 181 F. App'x at 832. The Portal-to-Portal Act
amended the FLSA and identifies employee activities that are not compensable under the
FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a).
12. Burton, 181 F. App'x at 832.
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Under the Portal-to-Portal Act, an employer is not liable under the
FLSA for failing to pay overtime compensation for: (1) traveling to and
from the employee's work site where the employee performs his
"principal activity or activities" or (2) activities that are "preliminary to
or postliminary to [the employees'] principal activity or activities," which
occur before the employee begins his workday or after the employee
finishes his workday."
Moreover, the Portal-to-Portal Act provides
that incidental use of an employer's vehicle for commuting is not
considered part of the employee's principal activities if the employee uses
the vehicle within the "normal commuting area for the employer's
business or establishment" and if there is an agreement between the
employer and the employee regarding the usage of the employer's
vehicle.' 4 However, under the Portal-to-Portal Act, preliminary and
postliminary activities are compensable if they are "'an integral
and
15
indispensable part of the [employee's] principal activities.''
On appeal, the County argued that under the Portal-to-Portal Act, it
was not required to compensate the plaintiffs for their travel time
because the county vehicles were used within the plaintiffs' normal
commute area, and there was an understanding between the County and
the plaintiffs regarding the use of the county vehicles.' 6 The Eleventh
Circuit determined that resolution of whether the plaintiffs were entitled
to overtime compensation for time spent traveling between the county
parking site and their work-site in a county vehicle rested on the
definition of "travel" in the Portal-to-Portal Act. 7 After reviewing the
statute and its regulations, the court determined that under the FLSA
regulations, traveling was defined to include incidental travel, such as
commuting from home-to-work or work-to-home, which is generally not
compensable.' 8 However, the court concluded that "travel from an
employer-designated location to the workplace is compensable under the
FLSA as that travel constitutes a part of the employee's principal
activity." 9 Consequently, the court determined that employer-required
travel that occurs when an "employer's mandate or job requirement

13. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a). See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005), as discussed in a
previous survey, for an extensive discussion of postliminary and preliminary time. Jerry C.
Newsome & K. Alex Khoury, Labor and Employment, 57 MERCER L. REV. 1159, 1160
(2006).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2).
15. Burton, 181 F. App'x at 833 (quoting Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956)).
16. Id. at 832.
17. Id. at 833-34.
18. Id. at 834.
19. Id.

1298

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

interrupts an employee's home-to-work and work-to-home path"20 fell
outside the Portal-to-Portal Act exemption and, therefore, was compensable under the FLSA.2 The court explained that the focus should not
rest on whether the employee used an employer-owned vehicle for the
travel, but instead on whether the employee was "requiredto return to
22
the employer's premises after a day's work prior to returning home."
Because the plaintiffs in this case were required to travel between the
county parking site and their work-site, the court determined that this
travel time was compensable.23
Another key issue that the court focused on in its determination of
whether the plaintiffs' travel time was compensable was the FLSA's
definition of "principal activity or activities." 24 Based on the Eleventh
Circuit's precedent in Dunlop v. City Electric, Inc.,25 the court determined that activities that are "'an integral and indispensable part of the
principal activities for which [the employees] are employed'" do not fall
under the Portal-to-Portal Act exemption and, thus, are compensable
under the FLSA.28 In this case, the County required the plaintiffs to
drive their personal vehicles to the county work-site closest to their
assigned work location and pick up a county vehicle to drive to the worksite. At the end of each workday, the plaintiffs were required to drive
the county vehicle to the county parking site because the County wanted
its vehicles stored in a secure location, and the County wanted to
prevent unauthorized or personal use of the vehicles." In addition, the
plaintiffs needed the county vehicles because that was where they stored
their equipment and the tools necessary to perform their duties.
Based on these facts, the court determined that the plaintiffs had to
begin and end their workday at the County's parking site to use the

20. Id.
21. Id. at 834-35.
22. Id. at 835.
23. Id. at 838.
24. Id. at 836-37.
25. 527 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1976). In Dunlop the former Fifth Circuit determined that
the term "principal activity or activities" includes "any work of consequence" and that the
Portal-to-Portal Act must be read together with the rest of the FLSA provisions. Id. at 398
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(a)). Accordingly, the court in Dunlop concluded that the Portalto-Portal Act did not intend for an employer to have to compensate an employee for
"activities 'predominantly spent in [the employee's] own interests.'" Id. (quoting Jackson
v. Air Reduction Co., 402 F.2d 283, 287 (6th Cir. 1968)). It is important to note that the
Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions before October 1,
1981. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981).
26. Burton, 181 F. App'x at 837 (quoting Dunlop, 527 F.3d at 399).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 838.
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county vehicles, and therefore, use of the county vehicles was "integral
and indispensable to the plaintiffs' principal activities."29 Furthermore,
the court concluded that, although the employees may have gained a
small benefit from not using their personal cars for part of their
commute, the County significantly benefited because the county vehicles
were stored in a secure facility, and the vehicles were not used for
personal or unauthorized purposes by the employees.3 ° For these
reasons and others, the court affirmed the district court's decision and
held that the plaintiffs should have been compensated for the travel
time.3 1 Later in 2006, the Middle District of Florida followed Burton
in Silas, finding that because the defendant and the allegations were
identical to those in Burton, the employees in Silas were also entitled to
overtime compensation.3 2
The decisions in Burton and Silas provide that an employer must
compensate an employee for employer-required travel time between two
employer locations when the employer derives a significant benefit from
that travel. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has already
denied the County's petition for certiorari,3 3 leaving the Eleventh
Circuit's decision intact. Accordingly, employers should review their
payroll policies to ensure that their employees are being compensated for
employer mandated travel time. Failing to do so could subject employers
to serious liability.

II.

THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT

In Hurlbert v. St. Mary's Health Care System, Inc.,34 the Eleventh
Circuit held that an individual can be incapacitated from one job and
continue to work at another position with a different employer and still
be entitled to FMLA leave.35
Thomas Hurlbert was a long-time
employee of St. Mary's Health Care System, Inc., ("St. Mary's") working
as a paramedic in 1989. Hurlbert also worked full-time with the
Rockdale County Fire Department ("Rockdale") as a firefighter and dealt
with hazardous materials and occasional paramedic duties. Hurlbert
was promoted to a supervisory position at St. Mary's shortly after his
employment began, which involved maintaining St. Mary's emergency
medical services ("EMS") vehicles. Five years later, Hurlbert's duties

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 837.
Id.
Id. at 840.
Silas, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79503, at *8.
Hillsborough County v. Burton, 127 S. Ct. 556 (2006).
439 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1296.
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changed when he became responsible for supervising three Emergency
Medical Technician shifts. Hurlbert's duties included ensuring that
EMS units were properly staffed, visiting and checking the various duty
stations, and transporting linens.36
In October 1999 Hurlbert had a heart attack but returned to work
after surgery on November 9, 1999 at St. Marf's and November 16, 1999
at Rockdale. Hurlbert, however, was diagnosed with depression, anxiety,
and sinusitis and was on medication for these conditions. 7
In February 2002 St. Mary's went through an internal reorganization,
which resulted in Hurlbert undergoing a competency evaluation. The
reviewer, Dr. Jerome Howell, deemed Hurlbert's performance unsatisfactory. Based on some family concerns and Hurlbert's inability to perform
under stress, Dr. Howell recommended that Hurlbert take some time off.
Dr. Howell discussed the results of Hurlbert's competency evaluation
with Mike McElhannon, St. Mary's educational director, and Jeff Sosby,
a manager at St. Mary's. Dr. Howell informed them that Hurlbert was
under stress and recommended placing Hurlbert in a position with more
manageable duties. Dr. Howell also discussed Hurlbert's performance
with Bonnie Butler, the executive director at St. Mary's, and inquired
whether Hurlbert could be placed in a different position. After this
discussion, Hurlbert spoke with Sosby about taking FMLA leave to deal
with his stress. Sosby informed Hurlbert that he would inquire into his
leave request and obtain a leave form."
Butler then met with Jeff English, St. Mary's vice president of human
resources and support services, and they discussed several options for
Hurlbert's employment, including: (1) helping Hurlbert find a different
position at St. Mary's; (2) allowing Hurlbert to resign with thirty days
of severance pay; or (3) terminating Hurlbert.3 9
On September 6, 2002, Hurlbert met with Sosby to fill out his FMLA
leave paperwork, but after initially agreeing to do so, Sosby informed
Hurlbert that the plans had changed and that Hulbert could either
resign and receive severance pay or be fired. Hurlbert refused to resign
and informed Sosby that he was clocking out and going home. However,
when Hurlbert went home, he received a phone call from Butler asking
him to come back to work. Hurlbert did so, and during the meeting with
Butler, Hurlbert inquired about his leave. When Butler informed
Hurlbert that he was not going to receive any leave, Hurlbert said the
meeting was over and that St. Mary's denial of leave was illegal. It was

36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1288-89.
1289.
1289-91.
1291.
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at this time that Sosby informed Butler that Hurlbert had requested
FMLA leave.4'
On September 10, 2002, Sosby received a letter from Hurlbert, which
purported to be a follow-up to his request for FMLA leave that was
recommended by Dr. Howell. The letter stated that Hurlbert was under
the care of his family physician, who agreed that Hurlbert needed a
thirty-day leave of absence for stress. Hurlbert also inquired as to
whether he needed to complete any paperwork for his leave. Hurlbert
attached a note from his physician, dated September 9, 2002, which
indicated that Hurlbert was under his care and that he could return to
work on October 9, 2002. Sosby and Butler discussed Hurlbert's letter,
and Butler informed Sosby that Hurlbert could not be granted FMLA
leave because St. Mary's had terminated his employment on September
6, 2002. However, it was not until September 18, 2002 that St. Mary's
issued a separation notice which stated that Hurlbert was terminated for
failing to meet his competency requirements.4 1
Hurlbert filed a complaint against St. Mary's, alleging that St. Mary's
interfered with his FMLA rights when it terminated him following his
request for leave and retaliated against him in violation of the FMLA.
The district court granted St. Mary's motion for summary judgment,
holding that both Hurlbert's FMLA interference and retaliation claims
failed. The court determined that, among other things, Hurlbert could
not establish that he was entitled to leave because his stress was not a
serious health condition as he was not incapacitated. The court also
determined that Hurlbert's retaliation claim failed because he had no
rights under the FMLA.42 During the district court proceedings,
Hurlbert argued that he suffered from a serious health condition because
he was diagnosed with anxiety after his 1999 heart attack, which was
evidence that he met the FMLA's definition of a serious health condition-a mental condition involving "continuing treatment by a health
care provider."4 3 Hurlbert further argued that he had a serious health
condition under FMLA because (1) his heart attack resulted in a period
of incapacity over three days, (2) his subsequent treatment for anxiety
included a regimen of continuing treatment (his prescription for anxiety),
and (3) his anxiety resulted in his being incapacitated for thirty days.
The district court rejected this argument."

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

1291-92.
1292.
1292-93.
1294.
1293, 1294-95.

1302

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

The district court relied on the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA")45 definition of "incapacitated" when it determined that Hurlbert could not have been incapacitated from his anxiety because he was
able to work his job at Rockdale during the thirty-day period, during
which he allegedly suffered a serious health condition and could not
work at St. Mary's.46 The district court determined that, under the
ADA definition, an individual must establish that he or she is unable to
perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs. The district court
further reasoned that although Hurlbert was unable to perform his
paramedic duties at St. Mary's, Hurlbert was able to perform his duties
at Rockdale. Because Hurlbert's duties at Rockdale were substantially
similar to his St. Mary's position, the district court determined that
Hulbert was not incapacitated during this period.47
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's opinion, holding that
the district court erred when it concluded that Hurlbert did not have a
serious health condition.' The court of appeals determined that the
district court erred in using the ADA's definition of incapacitated for an
FMLA determination of whether an individual suffered a serious health
condition.49 The Eleventh Circuit conceded that there were some
similarities between the ADA and FMLA regulations, but it relied on the
Eighth Circuit's decision in Stekloff v. St. John's Mercy Health Systems,5" in which the the court held that the ADA concept of disability
and the FMLA concept of serious health condition were "'different
concepts and must be analyzed separately.'"'"
The court in Stekloff determined that to meet the standard of a serious
health condition under the FMLA, it was sufficient for an individual to
demonstrate that he or she was unable to perform his or her current
position because of a serious health condition, even though the individual could still perform another job.52 Based on the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Stekloff, the court in Hurlbert determined that Hurlbert was
indeed incapacitated because he could not perform his duties at St.
Mary's, for which he requested FMLA leave.5" The court rejected St.
Mary's argument to the contrary and decided that the fact that Hurlbert
could perform his duties at Rockdale was irrelevant to a determination
45.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113 (2000).

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Hurlbert, 439 F.3d at 1295.
Id.
Id.
Id.
218 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2000).
Hurlbert, 439 F.3d at 1295 (quoting Stekloff, 218 F.3d at 861).
Stekloff, 218 F.3d at 861.
Hurlbert, 439 F.3d at 1295-96.
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of whether he had a serious health condition under the FMLA.54 As
such, the court determined that Hurlbert could have suffered a serious
health condition, even though he was able to work at Rockdale during
the thirty-day period he was unable to work at St. Mary's, and reversed
the district court's grant of summary judgment to St. Mary's. 5
The decision in Hurlbert makes it clear that employers cannot rely on
an employee's ability to perform another position to defeat an incapacity
determination under the FMLA's serious health condition standard.
Unlike the ADA's definition of incapacity, the FML's definition applies
only to the employee's current position and not a broad class of jobs.
Thus, employers should only focus on the employee's ability to perform
his or her current job to defeat a FMLA claim.
III. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
In Billings v. UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America,5" the Eleventh
Circuit decided an issue of first impression in a claim brought under
ERISA57 regarding whether an individual was wrongfully denied
disability benefits due to obsessive-compulsive disorder ("OCD").5" The
issue the Eleventh Circuit faced was whether a "'mental illness'
limitation of an ERISA-governed contract, which fail[ed] to provide
whether an illness [was] categorized as mental based on its symptoms
or etiology, is ambiguous."59
David M. Billings ("Billings") was employed as a pediatrician at
Pediatric Professional Associates, P.A., which had a long-term disability
("LTD") policy issued by UNUM Life Insurance Company ("UNUM").
Billings was diagnosed with OCD and major depression in November
1996 and was advised by his treating physician that he could not
continue his pediatrics practice. Billings stopped working and practicing
medicine on January 21, 1997. Around June 3, 1997, Billings filed a
claim for disability benefits with UNUM under the LTD policy due to his
OCD and major depression. UNUM approved his claim and started
paying Billings's disability benefits effective July 21, 1997. The policy,
however, contained a mental illness limitation, which provided that
benefits for mental illness disabilities were limited to twenty-four

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
459 F.3d 1088 (11th Cir. 2006).
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
Billings, 459 F.3d at 1090.
Id.
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months of payments.6' The policy defined mental illness as "mental,
nervous or emotional diseases or disorders of any type."6 1
In February 1999 UNUM informed Billings that because of the mental
illness limitation, his benefits for his OCD and major depression would
expire on July 20, 1999. Billings filed for continuation of his disability
benefits, claiming that he was disabled because of Meniere's Disease, a
condition of the inner ear that results in vertigo, hearing loss, and earringing or whistling. After investigating, however, UNUM determined
that Billings's Meniere's Disease was not severe enough to render him
incapable of performing his job. Consequently, UNUM terminated
Billings's benefits on August 13, 2001. Billings sued UNUM under
ERISA, alleging that it wrongfully denied him benefits for OCD and
Meniere's Disease.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. 2
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
granted summary judgment in favor of Billings, holding that UNUM's
mental illness limitation was ambiguous and, therefore, must be
construed in favor of Billings. The court reasoned that a mental illness
could either be categorized by its origins or its symptoms. The court
found that because the UNUM policy did not identify which classification applied, the policy was ambiguous.' In addition, the court found
that the policy's limitation did not apply to an illness with an "organic
or physical cause," such as OCD, which was a physiological condition
with mental symptoms, and accordingly, the policy's limitation did not
apply to Billings. Therefore, the district court interpreted the mental
illness limitation against UNUM and held that illnesses with an organic
origin did not fall within the limitation. UNUM appealed, among other
things, the court's decision that the mental illness limitation was
ambiguous.66
On appeal, UNUM argued that the definition of mental illness in the
policy's mental illness limitation was not ambiguous because there was
only one reasonable interpretation. 6 In addition, UNUM argued that
the district court's interpretation was unreasonable because it excluded
a mental disorder, OCD, from being considered a mental illness.67

60. Id. at 1090-91.
61. Id. at 1091.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1091, 1094.
66. Id. at 1093.

67. Id.
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UNUM asserted that the district court should have followed the basic
tenet of contract interpretation under ERISA and precedent from the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits6 8 that words are given their plain meaning.6 9 UNUM argued that the plain meaning of mental illness was any
illness that manifested itself through mental symptoms regardless of the
cause. 70 Billings, however, argued that UNUM's policy was ambiguous
because it did not indicate whether an illness was considered mental
based on its origin or its symptoms. 7' Therefore, Billings claimed that
the policy should have been construed in his favor and his interpretation-that OCD did not fall within the mental illness
72 definition because
it was a physically based condition-should apply.
The court turned to its prior decision in Dahl-Eimers v. Mutual of
Omaha Life Insurance Co., 7' in which it held that "[an insurance
contract is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two or more reasonable
interpretations that can fairly be made. When one of these interpretations results in coverage and another results in exclusion, ambiguity
exists in the insurance policy."74 In this case, the court weighed the

different results from the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits,
and ultimately, it agreed with decisions from the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits.75 Those courts concluded that mental illness limitations were
ambiguous when they did not define how a mental illness was classi6
7

fied.

Consequently, the court held that UNUM's mental illness limitation
was ambiguous as it applied to Billings because the "'policy contain[ed]
no definition or explanation of the term 'mental [disorder],' and offer[ed]
no illustration of the conditions that are included or excluded,' and
fail[ed] to 'contain any language suggesting whether the cause or the
manifestation determines whether an illness' falls within the limitation.'" 77 To resolve the ambiguity, the court applied the doctrine of
68. See Lynd v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 979, 983-84 (5th Cir. 1996);
Delk v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 104, 105 (8th Cir. 1992); Brewer v. Lincoln Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 150, 153-54 (8th Cir. 1990).
69. Billings, 459 F.3d at 1093.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. Billings supported his argument with decisions from the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits. See Phillips v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1992); Patterson
v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 11 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1993).
73. 986 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1993).
74. Id. at 1381 (internal citations omitted).
75. Billings, 456 F.3d at 1094.
76. Id.; see Patterson, 11 F.3d at 950; Phillips,978 F.2d at 308, 311.
77. Billings, 459 F.3d at 1094-95 (quoting Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d
534, 541 (9th Cir. 1990)).
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contra proferentem, which meant that the court would interpret any
ambiguities against UNUM.7" Thus, the court concluded that "Billings's organically based OCD does not fall within the policy's mental
illness limitation" and affirmed the district court's ruling.79
The decision in Billings should serve as a reminder to insurance
companies and administrators of benefit plans that they should properly
define how a mental illness is classified. This will help avoid any
ambiguity in interpreting any mental illness policies, which the Eleventh
Circuit decided would be construed against the insurance company. Of
course, based on the circuit split regarding the ambiguity of mental
illness limitations, it is possible the Supreme Court may step in and
overrule the Eleventh Circuit's decision. However, until that happens,
insurance companies and benefit plan administrators should draft their
mental illness limitations carefully.
IV.

THE UNIFORMED SERVICES EMPLOYMENT AND REEMPLOYMENT

RIGHTS ACT
In Breletic v. CACI Inc.-Federal,° the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia was asked to consider whether a
plaintiff's claims under the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act ("USERRA")81 could be the subject of
mandatory binding arbitration. 2 The plaintiff, John C. Breletic, Jr.
was hired by CACI Inc.-Federal ("CACI") in 2002 as an operations
research analyst. CACI provided IT systems integration and managed
network solutions to businesses and contractors, including the United
States Army. CACI occasionally hired current and former members of
the U.S. Army, such as Breletic. When Breletic was hired, CACI
required him to sign an employment agreement that was governed by
83
Virginia law and that contained a mandatory arbitration provision.
The arbitration provision provided that
[any controversy or claim arising out of, or relating to this Agreement,
or its breach, or otherwise arising out of or relating to my CACI
employment or the termination of such employment (including without
limitation to any claim of discrimination whether based on race, color,
religion, .national origin, gender, age, sexual preference, disability...
or any other legally protected status, and whether based on federal or

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 1095.
Id.
413 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
38 U.S.C. § 4301 (2000).
Breletic, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 1335.
Id. at 1331.
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State law, or otherwise) shall be settled first by resort to mediation...
and then, if mediation fails to resolve the matter, by arbitration.84
Breletic's primary duties at CACI included providing "organizational
analysis, organizational integration, and force integration projects for
classified and unclassified projects as directed by the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations at the U.S. Army Forces Command ("FORSCOM")
located at Fort McPherson, Georgia."85 Between February 2000 and
October 2, 2001, Breletic worked on a variety of projects under the
supervision of Joseph Fleck, a CACI senior director.8 6 Breletic's duties
later shifted when he became involved in "activation efforts associated
with the development, staffing, and coordination of a new military
organization, the Air Traffic Services Command ("ATSCOM"), which was
to provide command and control of United States Army air traffic
services worldwide."S
In September 2001 Breletic provided his supervisor with verbal and
email notification that he would likely be called to active duty in the
Army, which was formally ordered on October 3, 2001. While Breletic
was on active duty, the ATSCOM project was formally activated at Fort
Rucker, Alabama. There were eleven CACI employees on the project
before it moved to Fort Rucker; however, only one chose to relocate to
Fort Rucker to remain on the project. Two employees left CACI, and the
remaining employees were reassigned to other CACI projects that
supported the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations at FORSCOM in Fort
McPherson. On September 4, 2003, while Breletic was still on active
duty, an Atlanta director of CACI informed him that he no longer had
a job with CACI unless he was willing to relocate to Fort Rucker."8
Breletic was released from active duty on October 2, 2003, and on
November 5, 2003, he submitted a formal re-employment application to
CACI with his former supervisor, Fleck, and CACI's Human Resources
Manager, Richard Hart. Fleck informed Breletic on November 19, 2003,
that his job was abolished and, therefore, re-employment was not
possible. Breletic, however, believed that CACI was advertising for a
research analyst position connected to the ATSCOM project in Fort
McPherson, which was nearly identical to his previous position.
Nonetheless, CACI refused to re-employ Breletic and forced him to
interview for the advertised position like other applicants. At this time,
Breletic contacted the National Committee for Employer Support of the

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1332.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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Guard and Reserve, an advocacy group that assists reservists, which led
to CACI reinstating him. However, on December 19, 2003, Fleck notified
Breletic that his employment was terminated effective that day. 9
Breletic filed a complaint against CACI on November 3, 2004,
asserting that CACI violated his rights under USERRA when it failed
to properly reinstate him when his active military duty service expired
and that it retaliated against him because of his military service and his
attempt to exercise his rights under USERRA. CACI ultimately offered
Breletic a new position in December 2004 and presented him with a new
employment agreement ("2004 Agreement"), which contained an
arbitration provision that was subject to Virginia law and provided that
an arbitrator would decide all questions of arbitrability. The 2004
Agreement superseded Breletic's 2000 agreement.9 0 In addition to the
agreement, Breletic obtained a written promise from Fleck that the
terms of his employment as expressed in the 2004 Agreement "would be
subject to 'any and all rights [Breletic] may have under [USERRA].'" 91
Despite Breletic's re-employment with CACI, he continued pursuing his
complaint in court and refused to arbitrate his claims. CACI argued
that all of Breletic's claims were subject to binding mandatory arbitration under the 2004 Agreement and requested that the court dismiss the
complaint and
compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration
92
Act ("FAA").
In determining whether Breletic's USERRA claims could be the subject
of binding, mandatory arbitration, the court first decided whether any
external legal constraints would prevent arbitration on Breletic's
USERRA claims.93 Breletic argued that the 2004 Agreement was
preempted by USERRA, which, he argued, prohibits mandatory, binding
arbitration agreements for USERRA claims.94 The court turned to the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.95 for guidance. In Gilmer the Court held that arbitration
agreements encompassing statutory claims are enforceable unless
"Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver ofjudicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue."9" The Court in Gilmer also
determined that support for preclusion of arbitration agreements could

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id. at 1332-33.
Id.
Id. at 1333-34; 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2000).
Breletic, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 1334.
Id.
500 U.S. 20 (1991).
Id. at 26.
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be found in the legislative history of a statute or in an "'inherent conflict'
between arbitration and the [statute's] underlying purposes.
Accordingly, the court in Breletic examined the text of the USERRA
statute. 98
The court focused on 38 U.S.C. § 4302, a provision in the USERRA
statute providing that USERRA supersedes any contract that "reduces,
limits, or eliminates in any manner any right or benefit provided by [the
USERRA], including the establishment of additional prerequisites to the
exercise of any such right. 9 Based on this language, the court held
that"USERRA supersede[d] any arbitration agreements that abrogate[d]
in any manner the rights provided by the USERRA." ° °
The court noted that generally an individual entering into an
arbitration agreement for statutory claims does not abandon his
substantive rights under the statute.'' Rather, the individual transfers the authority for determination of those rights from a court to an
arbitrator. 12 Breletic, however, argued that the USERRA statute
guaranteed a service member's right to bring an action in any federal3
10
court in any state where the employer has a place of business.
Because the 2000 Agreement provided that Breletic must pursue his
claims in Virginia instead of Georgia, where he lived, Breletic reasoned
that the 2000 Agreement ran afoul of USERRA. 1° 4
Breletic's argument was further bolstered by the fact that the 2004
Agreement provided that Breletic relinquished his right to bring an
action in federal court.'0 5 Accordingly, based on these limitations, the
court determined that the 2004 Agreement did infringe on Breletic's
0 8
rights under USERRA, albeit minimally."
The court then turned to the legislative history of USERRA for
guidance and reviewed a House Report stating that arbitration of
USERRA claims was not required and that any arbitration decision for
a USERRA claim was not binding. 0 7 The House Report further

97. Id.
98. Breletic, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 1335.
99. Id. at 1336 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) (2000)).
100. Id.
101. Id.; see Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
102. Breletic, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 1336; see Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
103. Breletic, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 1336.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The court determined that arbitration agreements are contracts and are held
on even footing with contracts by the FAA. Id. (quoting Anders v. Hometown Mortgage
Serv., Inc., 346 F.3d 1024, 1032 (11th Cir. 2003)).
107. Id. at 1336-37.
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provided that any waivers to an individual's rights under USERRA must
be explicit and unequivocal." 8 In addition, the House Report noted
that "[an express waiver of future statutory rights, such as one that an
employer might wish to require as a condition of employment, would be
contrary to the public policy embodied in the Committee bill and would
be void."'0 9 Accordingly, based on the language in the House Report,
the court concluded that Congress intended USERRA to preempt
employment agreements that would limit an employee's rights under
USERRA or place conditions on those rights."' Moreover, the court
concluded that arbitration decisions on USERRA claims would not be
binding."'
In this case, the court concluded that the 2004 Agreement was an12
express waiver of Breletic's right to bring a USERRA claim in court."
Because such a waiver was in conflict with the public policy behind
USERRA, the court held that the arbitration agreement in the 2004
Agreement was preempted by USERRA."1 Furthermore, based on the
text of USERRA and its legislative history, the court held that USERRA
preempts arbitration agreements covering USERRA claims and114 that
USERRA claimants have a right to pursue their claims in court.
Moreover, the court rejected CACI's argument that under the 2004
Agreement, an arbitrator should have decided the issue of whether
Breletic's USERRA claims were arbitrable." 5 The court reasoned that
the issue of whether USERRA preempted an arbitration agreement
preceded any discussion on whether Breletic's claims were arbitrable."6 The court further reasoned that if Breletic's claims were
preempted from arbitration, there would be no issue regarding arbitrability because there would be no agreement to arbitrate. 1 7 As a
consequence of its determination that the 2004 Agreement was
preempted by USERRA, the court ruled there was no issue regarding
18
arbitrability.1
Additionally, the court rejected CACI's claim that Breletic waived his
rights under USERRA and agreed to arbitration when he signed the

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-65 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2453).
Id. at 1337 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-65).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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2004 Agreement.'19 According to the court, by signing the 2004
Agreement after commencing his suit against CACI, Breletic was not
clearly and unequivocally waiving his rights under USERRA. 2 °
Furthermore, the court relied on CACI's offer letter to Breletic, which
provided that the 2004 Agreement was subject to any rights Breletic had
under USERRA, as support that Breletic retained his right to bring
USERRA claims in court.'12 Therefore, the court held that Breletic did
not waive his rights under USERRA
and thus denied CACI's motion to
22
dismiss and compel arbitration.1
The court in Breletic forged new ground when it held that USERRA
claims generally are not subject to mandatory binding arbitration
agreements. Employers should review their employment agreements
that contain arbitration provisions and remove USERRA claims from the
list of statutory claims subject to arbitration. Based on the court's
decision in Breletic, employees can no longer prospectively waive
USERRA claims.
V.

UNDOCUMENTED LABORERS

In 2005 the Eleventh Circuit in Williams v. Mohawk Industries,
Inc. 123 determined that current or former employees have standing to
sue an employer under federal and state RICO statutes for "knowingly
hir[ing]" illegal workers. 2 1 In 2006, however, Mohawk Industries
("Mohawk") filed an application for writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court on two questions:
(1) Whether a defendant corporation and its agents can constitute an
"enterprise" under [RICO] in light of the settled rule that a RICO
defendant must "conduct" or "participate in" the affairs of some larger
enterprise and not just its own affairs [and] (2) Whether plaintiffs state
proximately caused injuries to business or property by alleging that the
hourly wages they voluntarily accepted were too low.'25
The Supreme Court granted Mohawk's writ for certiorari on its first
question only, 2 ' but after oral argument, the Court dismissed the writ,

119. Id. at 1337-38.
120. Id. at 1338.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., (Williams 1), 411 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2005).
124. Id. at 1257, 1259-60. See Newsome & Khoury, supra note 13, at 1172, for a
detailed analysis of this decision.
125. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., (Williams V), 465 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir.
2006).
126. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., (Williams I), 126 S. Ct. 830 (2005).
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vacated the Eleventh Circuit's 2005 decision, and remanded the case to
the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration in light of the Court's
decision in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.'2 7 On remand, the
Eleventh Circuit ordered briefing on both the Supreme Court's decision
in Anza and the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Williams General
Corp. v. Stone."
The plaintiffs in Williams, four former Mohawk hourly employees,
filed a class action against Mohawk, the second largest carpet manufacturer in the United States.'29 In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged
that Mohawk violated the federal and state RICO 30 statutes by
knowingly hiring and harboring illegal workers as part of a conspiracy
to repress overall wages and lessen workers' compensation claims. The
plaintiffs alleged that Mohawk employees recruited illegal aliens from
the Texas border and transported them to North Georgia to work for
Mohawk. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that Mohawk made incentive
payments to employees and recruiters to locate illegal aliens for the
company and that the recruiters and employees housed the illegal aliens
and helped them find employment with Mohawk. The plaintiffs further
alleged that Mohawk concealed its hiring and harboring of illegal alien
workers when it destroyed documents and assisted them in evading
detection by local law enforcement during searches and inspections at
Mohawk's facilities. In addition, the plaintiffs claimed that Mohawk's
extensive hiring and harboring of illegal aliens reduced labor costs and
increased the labor pool of illegal aliens hired by Mohawk, which in turn
depressed the wages paid to Mohawk's legal hourly workers. The
plaintiffs maintained that Mohawk was unjustly enriched under Georgia
law because Mohawk saved money by paying lower wages to illegal
aliens and because illegal aliens were less likely to file workers'
compensation claims. 3 '
In response to the plaintiffs' complaint, Mohawk filed a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia determined that the plaintiffs stated a
valid claim under state and federal RICO statutes, in addition to a valid
claim for unjust enrichment under state law, for the alleged purpose of

127. 126 S. Ct. 1991 (2006); Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc. (Williams III), 126 S. Ct.
2016 (2006).
128. 280 Ga. 631, 632 S.E.2d 376 (2006).
129. Williams IV, 465 F.3d at 1281.
130. The pertinent federal RICO statutes are codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and
§ 1964(c) (2000). The pertinent state RICO statutes are codified at O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22(a)(1)
and § 16-14-4(a) (2003).
131. Williams IV, 465 F.3d at 1280-82.
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suppressing wages. However, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' unjust
enrichment
claim based on the decreased workers' compensation
13 2
claims.
After reviewing the case for the second time, the Eleventh Circuit once
again determined that the plaintiffs sufficiently stated a claim under
both federal and state RICO statutes because, among other things, the
plaintiffs' complaint alleged that Mohawk engaged in a common
enterprise with its recruiters. 3 3 In making its decision, the court
relied on the plaintiffs' allegations that Mohawk directed recruiters to
recruit illegal aliens and also worked with the recruiters to provide
illegal aliens jobs at Mohawk. 33 Accordingly, the court deemed the
allegations sufficient to establish that Mohawk and the recruiters had
the common purpose to procure and hire illegal aliens at Mohawk so
that "Mohawk could reduce its labor costs and the recruiters could get
35
paid."
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the Supreme Court's
decision in Anza, in which the Court established that the plaintiffs must
adequately plead that the injury they claim occurred was proximately
caused by the defendants' RICO violations.' 6 The Court in Anza ruled
that "when a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the
central question it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly
to the plaintiff's injuries."3 7 In addition, the Court in Anza instructed
that courts should consider the "motivating principle[s]" behind the
directness component of the proximate cause standard in RICO
cases. 138 The Court in Anza identified a number of motivating princi-

132. Id. at 1282.
133. Id. at 1286. The court, however, determined that both of the plaintiffs' unjust
enrichment claims failed. Id. at 1294. The plaintiffs' first unjust enrichment claim failed
because, under Georgia law, an unjust enrichment claim applies only when there is no
legal contract. Id. at 1294-95. In this case, the court concluded that the plaintiffs could
state a contract action for failing to receive their full pay and, therefore, there could be no
unjust enrichment claim. Id. at 1295. Furthermore, the plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim
based on decreased workers' compensation claims was dismissed because the plaintiffs
failed to allege how the decrease in workers' compensation claims impacted the plaintiffs'
wages. Id.
134. Id. at 1286.
135. Id.
136. Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1997.
137. Id. at 1998.
138. Id. at 1997. In Williams IV, the court determined that to establish proximate
cause in RICO cases "it is enough for the plaintiff to plead and prove that the defendant's
tortious or injurious conduct was a 'substantial factor in the sequence of the responsible
causation.'" Williams IV, 465 F.3d at 1288.
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ples that courts should consider, including the difficulty in ascertaining
damages and the risk of duplicative recoveries." 9
Based on the Court's directives in Anza, the court in Williams
determined that the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded a RICO claim because
they established proximate cause. 4 ° The court relied on the plaintiffs'
allegations that Mohawk knowingly hired and harbored a large number
of illegal aliens to minimize labor costs, which in turn depressed the
wages for Mohawk's legal, hourly employees."" In addition, the court
determined there was no merit to Mohawk's argument that the United
States-and not the plaintiffs-was the most direct victim of Mohawk's
alleged RICO violations. 42 The court reasoned that under RICO's
provisions, Congress intended to criminalize the employment of illegal
Therefore, the court concluded
workers to protect legal workers."
that allowing legal workers who are directly affected by their employer's
hiring of illegal workers to privately enforce perceived RICO violations
was consistent with RICO's provisions.'" Based on all these factors,
the court determined that the plaintiffs' complaint contained sufficient
allegations to establish a direct relationship between their alleged
injury-decreased wages-and Mohawk's RICO violation and, therefore,
the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded a RICO claim.'45
The Supreme Court's decision to remand Williams to the Eleventh
Circuit leaves the question of whether private parties can file RICO
violations against employers based on illegal immigration practices in a
murky state. There is a split between the circuits, with the Second,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits concluding that such claims are cognizable,
while the Seventh Circuit, in a decision for which the Supreme Court
denied certiorari, concluded otherwise. However, the Eleventh Circuit's
second decision in Williams undoubtedly has established the law in this
circuit and opens numerous employers to potential liability for lawsuits
by private individuals to enforce immigration statutes.

139. Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1997-98. The court in Williams IV determined that the
damages in this case were not speculative because the plaintiffs were seeking recovery of
the diminution in their wages. Williams IV, 465 F.3d at 1290.
140. Williams IV, 465 F.3d at 1288.
141. Id. at 1288-89.
142. Id. at 1290.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.

